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One need not be a confirmed Humean in order to observe the effects of habit. When it 
comes to the contingencies of history, the conjunction of facts and a propensity to relate 
them to one another might indeed give rise to philosophical confusion. The practice of 
yoking Ludwig Wittgenstein and Arnold Schoenberg as intellectual comrades-in-arms of 
sorts seems to have already become commonplace. The prima facie appeal of such a 
practice is undeniable, and, indeed, one could hardly find a text on Fin-de-Siècle Vienna 
that does not underscore at least some similarity between the two great men—their 
biography, their cultural background, their intellectual projects, their personal fate. In 
such collage works, historians and philosophers alike often share an enthusiasm for bold 
brush strokes, which certainly serve a purpose within their overall perspective: to paint a 
picture of a cultural period to highlight common themes. Yet the thrust of the present 
essay is, in this sense, antithetical. This is an essay about differences and some of my 
brush strokes will be cautious and inevitably tentative. I contend that what sets 
Wittgenstein and Schoenberg apart from one another is much more interesting 
philosophically than the historical contingencies that seem to force them together. 
My discussion is divided into four parts. I pay a modest tribute in the first section 
to the historical leads and impasses that serve, so to speak, as a color palette for all those 
who paint with bold brush strokes. I then move, in the second and third sections, to 
explicate the various grounds for Wittgenstein’s dissenting attitude toward the 
contemporary music of his time, which I take to be a necessary step in any argument 
whose conclusion pertains to any relation between the respective ideas of Wittgenstein 
 2 
and Schoenberg. Finally, I turn in the final section to Schoenberg’s method of composing 
with twelve tones, framing it in the context of Wittgenstein's philosophical views on 
music. I shall try to show that the most plausible sense in which Schoenberg’s 12-tone 
system could indeed be rendered a serviceable image for Wittgenstein’s view of language 
is by way of contrast; by underscoring precisely what is unique about Wittgenstein's 
attitude toward language as music.  
 
Leads and Impasses 
The literature abounds with bold brush strokes. A few major examples should suffice. 
Hilde Spiel, for instance, is quick to compare the decisiveness with which Schoenberg 
and his disciples introduced new musical forms that ousted those of the past to the 
attempts of Wittgenstein and Schlick to purge metaphysics from philosophical thought.
1
 
William Johnston sketchily suggests that the aphoristic style of Schoenberg’s gigantic 
Gurrelieder, his last post-Romantic work, bore an affinity to fragments written by 
Wittgenstein;
2
 and that Wittgenstein (by unmasking self-deception in logicians) and 
Schoenberg (by deploring excesses of late Romantic music) “unleashed a conservative 
counterrevolution so drastic as to threaten their own values.”3 Allan Janik and Stephen 
Toulmin offer an elaborate argument for the relevance of Schoenberg’s 12-tone 
composition technique—peculiarly interpreted as an extension of Karl Kraus’ cultural 
critique into the realm of music—for the understanding of the intellectual milieu from 
which Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus emerged.4 
On occasions, the yoking of Wittgenstein and Schoenberg is merely 
juxtapositional, suggesting an inert connection via resemblance.
5
 However, my concern is 
with the more ambitious claim that certain technical aspects of Schoenberg’s music may 
be used as a heuristic device for unlocking or shedding light on certain aspects of 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy.6 Here, I suggest, the terrain is so uncharted that even an 
experienced traveler might go astray. For instance, in a recent lecture, delivered at 
Harvard on the occasion of a conference on Schoenberg’s chamber music, Stanley Cavell 
made the following suggestion: 
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My suggestion is that the Schoenbergian idea of the row with its unforeseen yet 
pervasive consequences is a serviceable image of the Wittgensteinian idea of 
grammar and its elaboration of criteria of judgment, which shadow our 
expressions and which reveal pervasive yet unforeseen conditions of our 
existence, specifically in its illumination of our finite standing as one in which 
there is no complete vision of the possibilities of our understanding—no total 
revelation as it were—but in which the assumption of each of our assertions and 
retractions, in its specific manifestations in time and place, is to be worked 
through, discovering, so to speak, for each case its unconscious row.
7
 
What kind of light might Schoenberg’s theoretical conception of the 12-tone row throw 
on Wittgenstein’s conception of grammar? Cavell maintains that Schoenberg’s use of the 
12-tone row exemplifies the communicability of the omnipresence of the inexpressible 
(or the “unheard,” as the title of his lecture suggests);8 and, apropos Wittgenstein, such 
characterization does strike a familiar note, or so it seems. The real question is actually 
whether the relentless striving for communicability, or rather for comprehensibility—to 
use Schoenberg’s own term9—that propels Schoenberg’s dodecaphonic compositional 
procedures is on a par with the relentless, genuinely philosophical striving for the 
surveyability of grammar. Here, it seems to me, one cannot hope for a real answer before 
considering seriously what a truly Wittgensteinian response to Schoenberg’s work might 
consist in. Yet such a response is not palpably within reach. It should be stated right at 
the outset, that any attempt to yoke Wittgenstein and Schoenberg for interpretative 
purposes is bound to occur in a convenient contextual limbo, underplaying a total absence 
of evidence, of any kind, of any direct influence, interaction or mutual interest between 
the two men. There is absolutely no reference to Arnold Schoenberg in Wittgenstein’s 
entire Nachlass or in the ancillary correspondences that have been made available to 
scholarship heretofore. Similarly, and perhaps less surprisingly, there is absolutely no 
reference to Ludwig Wittgenstein in Schoenberg’s literary estate.10 So here is our first 
impasse. 
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Another dead end is the alleged “Labor connection.” Composer, pianist and 
organist, Josef Labor, was “the Wittgenstein family court composer” and musical mentor 
of some of its members, and for a time he was a well-known musical figure in Vienna. 
His bust still stands in the garden of the Konzerthaus in Vienna, a forlorn witness to his 
long forgotten fame. His teaching, composition and musical performances exerted a 
significant impression on Ludwig Wittgenstein, as we can learn from numerous 
references in his writings and family letters.
11
 He actually counted Labor’s music among 
the very best of Austrian art (MS 107, 184 – CV, 3).12 Arnold Schoenberg was also 
acquainted with Labor. In his autodidactic beginnings as a composer, unsure of his talent 
and prospects, Schoenberg asked Labor for his opinion on one of his (Schoenberg’s) 
youth compositions. Labor graciously encouraged Schoenberg to pursue a professional 
career in music despite his lack of formal training in music and his lack of proficiency in 
playing the piano. Years later, Schoenberg expressed his appreciation for Labor’s 
favorable response in a letter sent to the elderly composer, in which he politely 
acknowledges the gratitude and respect of “modernists” like himself to old masters such 
as Labor.
13
 Schoenberg also included a performance of Labor’s clarinet quintet in D 
major Op. 11 in a concert of his Society for Private Musical Performances in Vienna. 
However, beyond these polite exchanges, and despite Schoenberg’s evident familiarity 
with at least some of Labor’s music, there is neither any reference to Labor in 
Schoenberg’s writings on music and musicians nor any reason to believe that Labor had 
any influence as a composer on Schoenberg’s own music. The New Grove Dictionary of 
Music and Musicians (first edition, 1980) seems to have initiated the common 
misconception that Schoenberg was actually Labor’s pupil.14 In the last analysis, the 
conjecture of a ready-made musical link between Wittgenstein and Schoenberg through 
the teaching and influence of Josef Labor remains unwarranted. 
However, it is still undeniable that Schoenberg’s presence was inescapable in the 
music scene of central Europe, in particular in Vienna, until he fled the Nazis in 1933 to 
settle eventually in the United States. As Leon Botstein points out, the kind of outrage 
expressed at Schoenberg in Vienna during the first decade of the 20
th
 Century surpassed 
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anything that had been leveled against Mahler and Strauss, or even against the new works 
of Pfitzner, Zemlinsky and Bartók, as Schoenberg drew heavy fire from eminent 
Viennese critics such as Robert Hirschfeld, Ludwig Karpath and Hans Liebstöckl.
15
 It 
seems unreasonable that his musical activity was totally unknown in the Wittgenstein 
family, which was so deeply involved and heavily invested in Viennese music; and 
indeed, quite on the contrary, Karl Wittgenstein, Ludwig’s father, actually supported 
Schoenberg financially at some point.
16
 It is also hard to believe that the resounding 
scandals that occurred in 1907 and 1913 during major performances of Schoenberg’s 
music in Vienna, the first even involving Gustav Mahler—Vienna’s music czar and a 
distinguished guest in the Wittgenstein Palais—could have escaped the attention of 
members of the Wittgenstein family.
17
 Not unrelated is that fact that Schoenberg’s music 
emerged as a concern in the Wittgenstein family: Paul Wittgenstein, the famous concert 
pianist, while being no less a 19
th
 Century man of music than his younger brother 
Ludwig, made a sincere effort to assimilate the various styles of contemporary music, and 
yet had no success with Schoenberg’s atonal idiom.18  
A few further contextual observations can also be made. The first decades of the 
20
th
 Century proved to be the most dramatic and eruptive period in the history of Western 
music. According to Paul Griffiths,  
At the moment when the First World War was about to begin, composers from 
quite different backgrounds, with Debussy, Schoenberg, Stravinsky and Webern 
at the head of them, had brought about the most rapid and far-reaching changes 
ever seen in western music. In the course of a few years the standard principles of 
tonality, formal direction and equilibrium, thematic continuity, rhythmic stability 
and orchestral homogeneity had all been questioned, sometimes all at once.
19
 
It is highly unlikely that Wittgenstein—a probing, well-informed and relentless intellect, 
immensely sensitive to music—was totally unaware of the violent shock waves 
emanating from the heart of the European continent, in particular from his native Vienna, 
which shattered Western tonal system and threatened to change forever the very essence 
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of music. In fact, Wittgenstein is on record for saying that the music of Alban Berg, 
Schoenberg’s famous pupil and enthusiastic advocate of 12-tone composition, is 
scandalous.
20
 Moreover, David Pinsent noted in his diaries of 1912-1913 vehement 
arguments between Wittgenstein and his fellow students in Cambridge concerning 
modern music.
21
 On the other hand, we see that when Rudolf Koder reported to 
Wittgenstein from Vienna about an upcoming high-profile concert of the Vienna 
Philharmonic Orchestra featuring Bruckner’s eighth symphony, he neglected, or found no 
reason to mention that the evening’s program featured also the Viennese première of the 
three orchestral pieces from Alban Berg’s Lyric Suite.22 Such circumstantial evidence 
suggests that the lack of reference to Schoenberg or to his 12-tone school in 
Wittgenstein’s writings was initially due to a lack of interest rather than to a lack of 
knowledge. On the eve of the Second World War, when Wittgenstein was in exile in 
England and Schoenberg in exile in the United States, this lack of interest was probably 
sealed by a lack of knowledge as well.  
The only lead that seems to promise something of an indirect and, as we shall see, 
ultimately antithetical link between Wittgenstein and Schoenberg is the alleged “Kraus 
connection.” It has been widely acknowledged that Karl Kraus’ influential preaching for 
the purification of language made a long-lasting impression on both men. Even in 1931, 
after his return to philosophy, Wittgenstein explicitly counted Kraus among the thinkers 
from whom he took a line of thinking for his own “work of clarification” (MS 154, 33 – 
CV, 19). On his part, Schoenberg gave Kraus a copy of his Harmonielehre—a book that 
contains the germ of his later embrace of atonal idiom in his own compositional 
practice—with the dedication “I have perhaps learned more from you than one is 
permitted to learn if one wishes to remain independent.”23 One could also think of a 
related secondary connection between Wittgenstein and Schoenberg through their 
respective friendships with Adolf Loos, Karl Kraus’ brother-in-arms in the fight against 
what the two perceived as the culturally malignant aestheticism and hedonism of that 
time. The facts in this case are established enough. Loos personally supported and 
promoted Schoenberg’s music, and his work clearly inspired certain aspects of 
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Wittgenstein’s solemn design of the house in Kundmanngasse in Vienna, built for 
Margaret Stoneborough-Wittgenstein.
24
 It is also clear that both Wittgenstein and 
Schoenberg admired Loos’ work and cultural stance. 
Still, the mere acknowledgement of such connections cannot carry us very far in 
terms of philosophical understanding; and, as it happens, a closer historical look only 
blurs the big picture. In the case of Loos and Schoenberg, there is at least an apparent 
asymmetry: for Loos, architecture was not a form of art. Loos argued passionately that 
while a work of art is revolutionary in its power to tear one out of one’s comfortable 
existence, a house is conservative: it is pleasant, practical, public. Loos’ revolt against the 
upsurge of ornamentation in practical design was, for all present purposes, an attempt to 
purify language precisely in Kraus’ sense of the term. For houses, like the components of 
language, are artifacts designed for daily use.
25
 
In one of his most famous aphorisms, Karl Kraus vividly portrays the cultural 
mission that he and Loos took upon themselves: 
All that Adolf Loos and I did—he literally, and I linguistically—was to show that 
there is a difference between an urn and a chamber pot, and that in this difference 
there is leeway for culture. But the others, the “positive ones,” are divided into 
those who use the urn as a chamber pot and those who use the chamber pot as an 
urn.
26
 
Here we certainly can find more than a merely accidental resemblance in at least 
Wittgenstein’s erstwhile attitude toward language. Now, one might ask, was 
Schoenberg’s quest for “the emancipation of the dissonance” akin to a purification of 
language in this sense? The answer is both yes and no. On the one hand, as Kraus 
suggests, the purification of language by means of showing the difference between an urn 
and a chamber pot entails a corresponding “purification,” or rather, liberation of the arts. 
For the arts must be unbounded by use, the sublime safeguarded. For that reason, 
Schoenberg of the middle period, the so-called atonal period in his music,
27
 enjoyed the 
critical patronage of Kraus together with Oscar Kokoschka and other artists of the 
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younger generation: the expressionists who dared “to express unmediated a raw and 
febrile existential truth that honored no cultural convention,” as Carl Schorske puts it.28 
One is tempted to say that, in defiance of aestheticm, Schoenberg of the middle period 
presented an urn that could no longer be used as a chamber pot.  
On the other hand, Schoenberg’s reaction to Post-Romantic excess in music was 
fundamentally different from Loos’ reaction to the Secession movement. The meaning of 
the emancipation of the dissonance cannot be captured in terms of a sort of removal of a 
façade of excessively embellished harmony from a bona fide musical structure. It is the 
culmination of a process that was already underway in the music of Gustav Mahler, 
Richard Strauss, Max Reger, Claude Debussy, Alexander Scriabin and others, in which 
the degree of emphasis on non-chordal tones reaches a point where tones lose their 
inclination to resolve at all. The dissonant harmonic complexes are no longer regulated 
by an underlying tonal structure but are “set free” as absolute harmonic entities, capable 
of standing on their own and related solely to one another. In his works from this atonal 
period, Schoenberg actually offered the arguably inevitable outcome of what he 
perceived as a complete and irreparable exhaustion of the hierarchic tonal system.
29
 Thus, 
if there is a sense of purification involved in the emancipation of the dissonance at all, it 
is purification in the sense of stamping out.  
Yet by 1923 Schoenberg’s expressionist phase reached a dead end. Disillusioned 
by his prewar, largely non-systematically atonal writing, Schoenberg set himself on a 
new course toward a rigorously systematized control over the chromatic materials from 
which he had emancipated himself. As I shall argue below, with this new musical project, 
Schoenberg decisively, albeit inadvertently, transgressed the Krausian framework of the 
urn and the chamber pot. Wittgenstein, who never did share Kraus’ and Loos’ enthusiasm 
for expressionism in art, and, in particular, for the progressive approach to musical 
composition, also set himself, before too long, on a new path, disillusioned by his own 
onetime quest for language in its pure and uncorrupted form, which is to be found 
underneath the rubble of language as used. Thus, we have reached another historical 
impasse; the divergent shifts in Wittgenstein’s view of language and in Schoenberg’s 
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view of the practice of composition circumscribe the grain of truth in the alleged “Kraus 
connection”. Yet this grain of truth is of genuine philosophical importance and in order to 
pursue it, we must break through this impasse. Hence we now turn to consider 
Wittgenstein’s attitude toward the contemporary music of his time. 
 
 
Aspects of Decline 
Wittgenstein’s fierce animosity toward modern music, noted en passant in the previous 
section, is well documented. Yet it is this explicit rejection of modern music that is being 
patently suppressed when Wittgenstein and Schoenberg are yoked together, rather than 
serving as a major premise in any attempt to spell out the true nature of whatever relation 
may obtain between their respective projects.
30
 It is worthwhile, I suggest, to look closely 
at this issue, not simply just as a matter of demarcating Wittgenstein’s musical taste, but 
rather as an important and highly instructive manifestation of his general attitude to his 
times. And as Georg Henrik von Wright so aptly put it,  
Fichte’s famous words ‘Was für eine Philosophie man wählt, hängt davon ab, was 
für eine Mensch man ist’, may not be interestingly applicable to the average, 
mediocre, academic philosopher. But for the great ones it is, I think, profoundly 
true. Their philosophy reflects their personality, and vice versa. And if 
personalities differ profoundly, so will the philosophies. Therefore it is not futile 
to look for the way in which Wittgenstein’s thought can be said to reflect his view 
of life.
31
 
Only three contemporary composers—all of them closely associated with the 
Wittgenstein family—are actually named in Wittgenstein’s writings or in related 
documentation: Richard Strauss, Gustav Mahler and Josef Labor. As noted before, Labor, 
the only contemporary composer unequivocally praised by Wittgenstein, is an 
exceptional case, and I shall have something to say about this later on. The other two 
composers had already been pressing music hard against the brink of atonality by the first 
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decade of the 20
th
 Century, and, evidently, Wittgenstein was familiar with at least some 
of their music. Mahler and Strauss each had a crucial role in driving Western tonal music 
into a dead end that resulted in nothing short of a crisis in musical language itself. This 
fact has been observed by Felix Salzer,
32
 and the particular reference to this eminent 
musicologist in the present context is, of course, far from being accidental. Felix Salzer 
was Ludwig Wittgenstein’s nephew, and according to Brian McGuinness, the two men 
spent some time together discussing Salzer’s own work and the music theory of Heinrich 
Schenker, who was Salzer’s mentor.33 These discussions began in 1926 and continued on 
to summers on the Hochreit, the Wittgenstein family country estate, in the early 1930s.
34
  
These intellectual exchanges on music set up an important nexus of ideas for our 
discussion. Evidently, Wittgenstein and Salzer shared an overall pessimism with regard 
to the prospects of recent musical innovations. This brand of cultural pessimism is clearly 
traceable to Oswald Spengler, on the one hand, and to Heinrich Schenker, on the other. 
Wittgenstein came under the spell of both thinkers around the same time. While 
exchanging ideas on music with Salzer, he was also reading Spengler’s magnum opus, 
The Decline of the West, in the late spring of 1930. Both thinkers enjoyed at least some 
credit in his eyes. According to Salzer, Wittgenstein’s judgement of Schenker’s view of 
music was not entirely negative.
35
 As for Spengler, despite being critical about what he 
perceived to be a number of irresponsible ideas in The Decline of the West, Wittgenstein 
nevertheless wrote in his diary on May 6, 1930: “Many, perhaps most [of Spengler’s 
ideas] are in total accordance with what I have been thinking myself” (D, 24). Of course, 
the mere conjunction of these facts does not imply that Wittgenstein was inclined to 
entertain the ideas of the two thinkers on the same track. Yet, luckily, we do have a 
“smoking gun”: by 1931 Wittgenstein felt himself versed enough in Schenker’s approach 
to music to relate it to his own notion of “family resemblance,” which he had adapted 
from Spengler’s morphological approach to cultural epochs.36  
The direct influence of Oswald Spengler, a philosophical dilettante full of sound 
and fury, on Wittgenstein’s work—corroborated by the latter’s own admission (MS 154, 
33 – CV, 19)—caught most scholars by surprise in 1977 upon the publication of the 
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posthumous volume Vermischte Bemerkungen (later published in English as Culture and 
Value). However, since then, this influence has been widely acknowledged, and it is now 
fairly established that Wittgenstein espoused Spengler’s views on two major fronts. First, 
as Georg Henrik von Wright has argued on various occasions, Wittgenstein shared 
Spengler’s cultural pessimism and his perspective of epochal decline. According to von 
Wright, 
Wittgenstein did not, like Spengler, develop a philosophy of history. But he lived 
the ‘Untergang des Abendlandes’, the decline of the West, one could say. He 
lived it, not only in his disgust for contemporary Western civilization, but also in 
his deep awe and understanding of this civilization’s great past.37 
Furthermore, according to Rudolf Haller,  
Wittgenstein finds in Spengler not only an intellectual kinsman, who declares his 
alienation from the surrounding civilization, with its symptoms of a declining 
epoch, but also the initiator of an approach or ‘line of thinking’ which seems to 
him most appropriate as the methodological tool for the investigation of language 
games.
 38
 
This “line of thinking” is the main principle of comparative morphology or the 
“physiognomic method,” originally derived from Goethe’s writings—a conceptual 
iceberg, of which Wittgenstein’s adaptation of the pervasive notion of “family 
resemblance” in his later writings is merely the tip.  
Wittgenstein’s famous 1930 sketch for a forward to his Philosophical Remarks 
provides a sweeping impression of Wittgenstein’s alienation from the contemporary art 
of his time (he names modern music and architecture in particular) and its deceptive spirit 
of progress (MS 109, 204ff. – CV, 6-7). The “great suspicion (though without 
understanding its language)” with which Wittgenstein approached modern music, by his 
own admission, and his lamentation of “the disappearance of the arts” mark a clear point 
 12 
of convergence with Spengler’s somewhat more furious yet strikingly similar remarks on 
the impotence and falsehood of contemporary art: 
What do we posses today as ‘art’? A faked music, filled with artificial noisiness 
of massed instruments; a faked painting, filled with idiotic, exotic and showcard 
effects, that every ten years or so concocts out of the form-wealth of millennia 
some new ‘style’ which is in fact no style at all since everyone does as he 
pleases.
39
 
Spengler’s fingerprints are unmistakable also in Wittgenstein’s later comments on the 
deterioration of high culture in his 1938 lectures on aesthetics, especially in 
Wittgenstein’s characterization of artistic decline in terms of a breakdown of artistic 
necessity through reproduction of artifacts and a corresponding deterioration of 
sensitivity leading to indifference, and also in his curious remark concerning vintage 
furniture (LC, 7).
40
 
So much is obvious; yet I suggest that Spengler’s impact on Wittgenstein’s 
thinking about art runs deeper still. To realize this, we need to turn now to Heinrich 
Schenker. Schenker’s pessimism concerning the prospects of modern music is 
intrinsically related to his unique view of musical composition. Working up his case by 
meticulously analyzing masterworks of Western music, Schenker theorized that works of 
music that are tonal and exhibit mastery are temporal projections of a single element: the 
tonic triad. According to Schenker, the projection of this triad comprises two processes: 
(a) the transformation of the triad into a basic contrapuntal design, which he called 
Ursatz;
41
 and (b) the Auskomponierung or elaboration of the Ursatz by various techniques 
of prolongation. This notion of music is highly abstract; in practice, as Schenker shows in 
his own analyses, the process of elaboration begins when the Ursatz is already in an 
articulated form—this he called Hintergrund, or the "background" of the work. The 
number of possible forms of background is theoretically infinite.  
Yet, at the heart of Schenker’s abstract notion of music, one finds the conviction 
that the masterworks of Western music teach us that hearing music consists in 
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recognizing a structural standard, which is shared by anything that we may rightfully call 
music. Hearing music as an "exfoliation" of this fundamental structure is part of the 
“phenomenology” of musical perception, rather than a matter of inference or analysis. As 
Milton Babbitt pointed out, the crucial idea in Schenker’s view of music is “the 
perception of a musical work as a dynamic totality, not as a succession of moments or a 
juxtaposition of ‘formal’ areas related or contrasted merely by the fact of thematic or 
harmonic similarity or dissimilarity.”42 According to Schenker, all works of music (in 
particular all masterworks) are, in a sense, extended commentaries on the tonic triad. In 
effect, Schenker’s theory embodies an attempt to describe musical thinking itself: it 
describes how we keep a single triad in mind over a period of time, and how we interpret 
configurations of notes as contributing to the continuity of that cognition. 
Thus, is becomes a matter of analytic truth, that all works of music that digress 
from triadic tonality—that is, whose Schenkerian analysis shows that their surface, or 
“foreground,” cannot be hierarchically related by a series of expansions (“middleground” 
layers) to a constant “background”, and ultimately, to the Ursatz—are to be patently 
rejected by Schenker as unsuccessful, superficial, or altogether musically nonsensical, 
depending on how severe the digression is. Schenker’s hostility toward contemporary 
music was fueled not only by his mighty theory of music, but also, and perhaps even 
more significantly, by his conviction that the results of his theory betoken a disintegration 
of musical culture on all fronts.
43
 Irreverence toward the laws of tonal effect, he believed, 
reflects a loss of musical instinct for the inner complexities of the masterworks of 
Western music among performers and composers alike, which in turn hinders the 
musician’s almost sacred mission to provide access to the world of human experience 
contained in such masterworks. Thus, he likened contemporary music making to a 
Chinese person picking up a text by Goethe without having sufficient knowledge of the 
German language.
44
 
In the face of the dramatic changes in compositional techniques that had taken 
place at the turn of the 20
th
 Century, Schenker stated as early as 1910 that music, like the 
once-great cities of Herculaneum and Pompeii, lay in ruins. He openly disapproved of the 
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compositional practice of Mahler, Strauss, Reger, and Schoenberg.
45
 He also deplored the 
fact that people no longer made distinctions between the output of composers like 
Debussy, Ravel and Stravinsky, and the masterworks of Bach, Mozart and Beethoven, 
and, in effect, treated them as if they were all "music" in the same sense. In Schenker’s 
view, the emancipators of the dissonance were merely reveling in empty sonorities, being 
unable to bind them together as elaborations of a single chord.
46
 Of course, Arnold 
Schoenberg's musical and theoretical output was an anathema for Schenker, and the two 
men were entangled in bitter, extensive polemics against one another.
47
 I shall return to 
the roots of this dispute in the next section. 
My précis of Schenker’s highly technical writings is inevitably oversimplified. 
Yet it allows us to see fairly easily how the main thrust of Schenker’s view of music 
coincides with Wittgenstein’s thinking. In section 58 of the so-called “Big Typescript” 
(cf. MS 111, 119 – CV, 14), Wittgenstein reprimands Spengler’s dogmatism in sorting 
cultural epochs into families, ascribing properties, which only the prototype, or archetype 
(Urbild) possesses, to the object that is viewed in its light. This is the context in which 
Wittgenstein saw a connection with the Schenkerian view of music. The Schenkerian 
Ursatz, which encapsulates the whole of triadic tonality, is the Urbild in Wittgenstein’s 
analogous construal. Hence, analogously, Schenker’s mistake is in the way that he 
extends the scope of statements true of tonality (in its pre-articulated form) to particular 
works of tonal music. Clearly, behind this mistake stands the “craving for generality” that 
Wittgenstein often diagnoses and condemns (see e.g. BB, 17-18). Indeed, Schenker seems 
to have envisioned that his theory amounts to nothing less than a fully-fledged essentialist 
account of music, a complete analytic definition of the concept of music, which lays 
down necessary and sufficient conditions for its application, and hence, as we have seen 
before, entails a clear demarcation between bona fide cases of music and what is to be 
regarded, in lieu of a better term, as non-music.  
The upshot of Wittgenstein’s conflation of Schenker and Spengler is this. 
Wittgenstein is committed to the contention that triadic tonality is the focal point for 
comparing musical instances; he also maintains that various musical instances may bear 
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more or less family resemblance to one another, to the extent of the exclusion of certain 
instances. Yet Wittgenstein is bound to deny that the general validity of the concept of 
tonality depends on the claim that everything which is true only of the abstract 
Schenkerian Ursatz (qua the prototype of the observation) holds too for all the musical 
instances under consideration. Rather, when the prototype is clearly presented for what it 
really is, and thus becomes the focal point of the observation, the general validity of the 
concept of tonality will depend on the fact that it characterizes the whole of the 
observation and determines its form. In this anti-essentialist vein, the Schenkerian Ursatz 
becomes a mere methodic device that can be laid alongside the musical instances under 
consideration as a measure.
48
 
While Wittgenstein never did address the concept of tonality directly, at least the 
rudiments of what we might call his "philosophical conception of tonality" can still be 
extracted from what he did write about such matters as the rules of harmony and their 
effects. I shall dedicate the remainder of this section to the fleshing out of this crucial 
issue. Yet, before I do that, a few general remarks on Wittgenstein's various texts on 
musical experience are in order. The bulk of these texts belong, by and large, to his later 
work, and they are thematically indigenous to his thinking on philosophical psychology. 
Wittgenstein's discussion of musical experience occurs at the intersection of three often-
overlapping concerns: (a) the grammatical complexity of language games that pertain to 
aesthetic phenomena and to musical experience in particular; (b) the pervasiveness of 
aspect dawning, in particular in music; and (c) the notion of physiognomy and its 
philosophical ramifications. I have dealt with these issues in some detail elsewhere,
49
 so I 
will restrict myself here to a brief summary.  
According to Wittgenstein, our intercourse with music exemplifies a special kind 
of grammatical complexity: each move in the language game played logically 
presupposes corresponding moves in various other games, ultimately presupposing “the 
whole range of our language games” (MS 132, 59 – CV 52). In this sense of a logical 
hierarchy between language games, we may speak of the meaning of a musical gesture in 
terms of what I would like to call a "vertical axis".
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 Yet what makes our musical 
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experiences akin to aspect dawning on the one hand, and to what Wittgenstein calls “the 
use of words in a secondary sense” (PI II xi 216), on the other, is the manner in which we 
reach for a certain expression as the only possible way in which to express our 
experience, our perceptions, inclinations and feelings. Just like our expression of aspect 
dawning or our use of words in a secondary sense, the specificity of a musical gesture lies 
in the absence of a "more direct" way of expressing the experience in question. Here, 
according to Wittgenstein, music and language intertwine, or as he put it, "the [musical] 
theme is in reciprocal action with language" (MS 132, 59 – CV 52); the relation between 
the musical gesture and the thing expressed is internal.
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An important facet of Wittgenstein's discussion of musical expression is the 
logical implications of his emphasis on the notion of physiognomy. The notion of 
physiognomy—the meaningful irregularity of the living body—is central both to his 
explication of aspect seeing (PI II xi 193) and to his various discussions of musical 
expression (LC 4; PI §536; RPP I §434; CV 52). According to Wittgenstein, enormous 
variability, irregularity, and unpredictability are an essential part of human physiognomy 
and the concepts for which human physiognomy serve as a basis (RPP II §§614-615, 617, 
627). Musical gesture is akin to human physiognomy in being fundamentally non-
mechanical; it cannot be recognized or described by means of rules, and it introduces 
indefiniteness, a certain insufficiency of evidence, into our musical understanding that is 
constitutive in a logical sense, hence not indicative of any deficiency of knowledge (see 
e.g. MS 137, 67 – CV 73; RPP II §695; Z §157). The concept of musical expression, like 
the concept of “soul”, is diametrically opposed to the concept of a mechanism (cf. RPP I 
§324)—an exact, definite calculation and prediction is conceptually detrimental to what 
we regard as musical expression. Thus, musical gesture admits what Wittgenstein calls 
"imponderable evidence": “subtleties of glance, of gesture, of tone” that form a basis for 
our Menschenkenntnis, our “knowledge of mankind”—a kind of knowledge or a skill that 
can be learned by some and taught by some, yet only through “experience” or “varied 
observation” and by exchanging “tips” (PI II xi 227-229). The imponderability of this 
kind of evidence is significantly reflected in the way we attempt to express our 
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experiences, and in the measure of the success of what we offer as our "justifications"; 
that is, significantly, in our interlocutor's willingness to follow the rules of the game that 
we are playing, using concepts based on indefinite evidence (LW I §927). 
Considering musical meaning, an internal relation adjoining musical gesture and 
the life of mankind (shown by language), enables us to appreciate Wittgenstein's 
assertion: "For me this musical phrase is a gesture. It insinuates itself into my life. I adopt 
it as my own" (MS 137, 67 – CV 73). What we nonchalantly call "music" or "a melody" 
is already given to us with a familiar physiognomy, its impression vertically related to a 
myriad of other language games in its significantly human environment. And so, says 
Wittgenstein, “understanding music is an avowal of the life of mankind” (MS 137, 20). 
Wittgenstein's contention that music opens up a realm of Menschenkenntnis for us to 
partake underscores the strong affinity with Heinrich Schenker's aforementioned view of 
the role and the profundity of the great masterworks of Western music in providing 
access to the world of human experience. 
Let us now turn to Wittgenstein’s treatment of the notion of Harmonielehre. It 
should not be surprising that Wittgenstein regarded Harmonielehre, the systematic 
representation of the rules of tonal effect, as grammar.
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 Harmonielehre typically 
describes the way we hear harmonic relations and prescribes methods for constructing 
chord progressions in a way that renders these relations clear and distinct. As one would 
expect, Wittgenstein maintains that a musical passage is not an arbitrary string of sounds; 
the right way to combine a musical tone with other tones is somehow already built into 
the tone itself.
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 In fact, this was considered the essence of tonality from roughly 1600 to 
1910: a mere sequence of notes is not a musical phrase until it is heard as organized 
around one privileged tone, namely, the tonic. Wittgenstein says in acknowledgement:  
[t]he finitude of the musical scale can only derive from its internal properties. For 
instance, from our being able to tell from a note itself that it is the final one, and 
so that this last note, or the last notes, exhibit inner properties which the notes in 
between don’t have. (PR §223) 
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The privileged status of the tonic is a property which it cannot fail to possess, because it 
is essential to its being the thing it is. Thus, according to Wittgenstein, tonal relationships, 
represented by Harmonielehre, are internal, that is, they cannot fail to obtain, since they 
are given with, or constitutive of, the relata in practice; they cannot be underpinned or 
explained by postulating mediating links between the relata. 
Wittgenstein illustrated this point in The Brown Book by discussing the 
phenomenon of hearing the same tone again in a diatonic scale (BB, 140-141)—certainly 
one of the most fundamental tonal effects in music. The question is why we call tones 
that appear in an interval of an octave “the same tone.” Wittgenstein asks us to imagine a 
case in which a person calls the tonic, the dominant and the octave, “the same tone.” His 
point is that we can say that this person hears different things than we do, insofar as we 
do not assert that there must be some other difference between this person and us besides 
the aforementioned. Simply put, the only thing that we can say in this case, and in any 
similar case, is that two tones that stand in the relation of “sameness” cannot be a tonic 
and a dominant, or a dominant and an octave. Tonality is mirrored by grammatical 
analysis.
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 Thus Harmonielehre represents the grammar of tones in a way that is 
analogous to Wittgenstein onetime example of the color octahedron (see PR §1, §3): it is 
“at least in part phenomenology and therefore grammar” (PR §4).  
We can see that quite in accordance with Wittgenstein's general view of musical 
meaning, which I described above, the most important feature of his treatment of 
Harmonielehre is the emphasis on its being a representation of internal relations, hence 
on the primacy of praxis. Tonality (experiencing and expressing certain relationships 
between tones) is effected by the way we recognize and describe things, and to that extent 
Harmonielehre is not a matter of taste (PR §4). In 1934, Wittgenstein wrote: 
Is the Harmonielehre constructed in accordance with our feelings; do we try out 
whether a [chord] progression pleases us [insertion: more or less], in the way that 
we perhaps select the ingredients of a dish according to our taste? And is the 
difference perhaps in that there are valid rules for the taste in chord progressions 
that are more general than [the rules for the taste] in food? Could one reason be 
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given at all for why the Harmonielehre is the way it is? And, first and foremost, 
must such a reason be given? It is here and it is part of our entire life. (MS 157a, 
24-26) 
The comparison between rules of grammar and rules of cookery is standard in 
Wittgenstein’s later writings (see e.g. PG §133; TS 213, 236). It serves the purpose of 
highlighting the unique status of rules of grammar. According to Wittgenstein, rules of 
cookery can be justified by appealing to their (external) purpose, i.e. creating a delectable 
dish. The goal of cooking is independent of the rules of cookery: if I decide to improvise 
in the kitchen, I should bear in mind the old maxim that the proof of the pudding is in the 
eating. The rules of cookery are therefore constituted externally by the desired result, 
which is causally effected by the activity of cooking and by various other contingencies 
(such as the kind of ingredients that I happen to have in my kitchen cabinet etc.). Thus we 
may legitimately speak of right or wrong rules of cookery (to wit, those which happen to 
bring about a tasty dish are right). In contradistinction, if rules of grammar define a 
practice (i.e., if they do not admit alternatives), then they cannot be said to be constituted 
externally in this sense. A systematic deviation from the rules of grammar entails a 
wholesale rejection of the practice defined by those rules.  
The status of Harmonielehere as a representation of grammar means that, for 
Wittgenstein, tonality sets limits to what makes (musical) sense. Here Wittgenstein seems 
to be in complete agreement with Heinrich Schenker. Still the profundity of 
Wittgenstein's philosophical emulation of Schenker's view of music is revealed when we 
consider that for Wittgenstein, what a musical gesture means is determined by its 
"vertical axis", that is, by consisting in a move in a vertically complex language game of 
the kind described above. Wittgenstein makes this explicit in the following passage from 
1946: 
We can apply to the melodies by the various composers the principle: each 
species of tree is a ‘tree’ in a different sense of the word. That is, don’t be misled 
by the fact that we say all these are melodies. They are stages along a path which 
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leads from something you would not call a melody to something else that you 
would equally not call a melody. If we just look at the sequences of notes and 
changes of key all these entities [Gebilde] seem to be in coordination [in 
Koordination]. But if you look at the environment in which they exit [das Feld in 
dem sie stehen] (and hence at their meaning), you will be inclined to say: In this 
case melody is something quite different from what is in that one (amongst other 
things, here it has a different origin and plays a different role). (MS 131, 12 – CV, 
47)
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From Wittgenstein's perspective, we can say that by showing that (great) works of music 
are, in the last analysis, extended commentaries on the tonic triad, Schenker has merely 
given us a focal point or a measure for the observation that each instance of a musical 
gesture is a gesture in a different sense of the word.
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 Wittgenstein's somewhat cryptic 
way of defining musical gesture as "stages along a path" that adjoins what is not yet 
music with what is no more music, betokens of an internal relation, which, as I have 
suggested, is the mark of musical meaning. Hence, for Wittgenstein, looking at the 
meaning of a musical gesture amounts to looking at the actual language game in which it 
is embedded, and its vertical relation to a range of other language games. 
Since tonality cannot be vindicated by reference to putative facts about the world 
or about the mind, as Schenker believed, there is no sense in seeking the reason why 
Harmonielehre, the grammatical representation of tonal manifestations, is the way it is. 
As Wittgenstein put it, “[that reason] is here and it is part of our entire life”; that is, the 
musical distinctions that we make have to be important to us, given the kind of beings we 
are, the purposes we have, our shared discriminatory capacities, and certain general 
features of the world we inhabit. This leaves more than ample room for composers to 
extend the range of musical expression (see LC, 6; MS 133, 30 – CV, 55). Yet the 
boundaries of sense are also clear, and they suggest two important angles on the decline 
of modern music. First, since the rules of harmony are not constituted externally by 
concocting chord progressions according to taste, those composers who do so, those who 
revel in empty sonorities (to use Schenker’s phrase), tarnish the tonal idiom from within, 
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so to speak, by ungrammatical and effectively senseless gesticulation.
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 Still, a 
comprehensive Harmonielehre—"just looking at the sequences of notes and changes of 
key"—can readily expose such grammatical mishaps for what they are: simply wrong. 
Second, a much more serious transgression of tonality would amount to a wholesale 
rejection of its praxeological foundation, ultimately a nonsensical transgression of the 
"reason" why the practice is the way it is, to wit, “our entire life”. Wittgenstein’s point is 
that such a perversion of musical gesture could no longer be either right or wrong, for it 
would amount to “speaking of something else” (cf. PG §133). To this latter, deeper worry 
we shall now turn. 
 
 
The Music of the Future 
It would be worthwhile, I think, to take a closer look at some of Wittgenstein’s remarks 
on the music of Gustav Mahler—praised already in his lifetime as “the contemporary of 
the future”—the only truly modern composer, who apparently was great enough in 
Wittgenstein’s eyes to be worthy of attention. Wittgenstein’s somewhat abusive remarks 
on Mahler, those scattered in his various writings and those relayed to us by friends and 
disciples, exemplify a distinct duality toward Mahler’s musical persona that was typical 
among Austrian literati at that time. Carl Schorske describes this as a duality in Mahler’s 
functional relation to the classical tradition; an acute tension between Mahler’s 
acceptance as a conductor—a guardian of the abstract, autonomous music so cherished 
by the educated elite—and his rejection as a composer, who subversively attempted to 
imbue abstract high-culture music with concrete vernacular substance.
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 Georg Henrik 
von Wright recalled from his conversations with Wittgenstein that Wittgenstein had a 
tremendous respect toward Mahler, not only as a conductor (Wittgenstein thought that as 
a conductor, Mahler was unequalled), but also as a composer, although he did believe 
strongly that there is something deeply faulty in Mahler’s music.59 Mahler was a genuine 
problem for Wittgenstein, a limiting case in the history of Western music—“You would 
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need to know a good deal about music, its history and development, to understand him,” 
said Wittgenstein at one point.
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Let us first consider two passages that Wittgenstein wrote in 1931: 
When our late, great composers sometimes write in simple [variant: clear] 
harmonic progressions [variant: relations], then they bear witness to their 
ancestral mother [Stammutter]. Mahler appears to me precisely at these moments 
(when the others move me the most) exceptionally unbearable, and I always 
would like to say: but you merely heard this from the others, this does not (really) 
belong to you. (D, 47) 
A picture of a complete apple tree, however accurate, is in a certain sense much 
less like the tree itself than is a little daisy. And in the same sense a symphony by 
Bruckner is infinitely closer to a symphony from the heroic period than is one by 
Mahler. If the latter is a work of art it is one of a totally different sort. (But this is 
actually itself a Spenglerian observation.) (MS 154, 39 – CV, 20) 
Given Wittgenstein's contention that musical meaning is an internal relation in which 
music and language are in reciprocal action, it is clear why he says that he is moved most 
strongly when composers (other than Mahler) write in the clearest tonal idiom. Such 
familiar musical gestures—a perfect cadence, for instance—are already deeply 
entrenched as parts of our life; as Wittgenstein put it, what is ordinary is filled with 
significance (cf. MS 132, 59 – CV, 52). Yet Wittgenstein believes that precisely in such 
moments of great expressive transparency, a transgression is taking place in Mahler’s 
music: the avowal is not genuine. It is crucial to understand exactly why Wittgenstein 
finds Mahler most unbearable when he writes in simple tonal relationships, rather than in 
his many moments of extraordinary harmonic daring. Perhaps the best way to approach 
this problem is to acknowledge Wittgenstein’s striking grasp of the essence of Mahler’s 
musical language. Mahler’s mature works—e.g. his fourth symphony—display 
significant ambivalence in the area of harmony and tonal relationships. On the one hand, 
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the music often seems deceptively conservative, employing undisguised dominant 
relationships that still play an essential structural role. On the other hand, as Robert 
Morgan observes, “tonality in Mahler comes close to reaching its final stage of 
dissolution: complete works, and even individual movements, no longer necessarily 
define a single key, but explore a range of related and interconnected regions, often 
closing in a different key from the one in which they began. … Such procedures alter the 
very meaning of tonality, which becomes a complex network of interchangeable 
relationships, rather than a closed system that ultimately pulls in a single, uncontested 
direction.”61  
This observation suggests that Wittgenstein’s criticism of Mahler’s music focused 
on its allegedly perverse toiling with tonality rather than on the vagaries of over-stretched 
chromaticism. In other words, Mahler was a problem for Wittgenstein because his 
musical gestures only play at being in reciprocal action with language (and our life), and 
what is familiar cannot be other-worldly at the same time. Wittgenstein’s comparison 
between Mahler and Bruckner provides further support of this view. To a significant 
extent, the music of these two great composers exhibits strikingly similar surface 
characteristics: the evident employment of Wagnerian compositional techniques, 
extended chromaticism, the enormous length of their works that extends far beyond the 
traditional symphonic form, the juxtaposition of contrasting musical materials, etc. 
Interestingly, Wittgenstein’s reaction to such musical innovations was quite favorable, as 
we can learn, for example, from his enthusiastic correspondence with his sister Hermine 
concerning Bruckner’s third symphony in D minor, in particular its third movement, the 
scherzo.
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In a letter dated January 22, 1948 to Ben Richards, Wittgenstein’s commented on 
this work: 
Of course what you say about the ending of the 3
rd
 movement (Bruckner) isn’t 
final. His ‘abruptness’ is an essential part of his language. He writes in ‘main 
clauses’ (I’m not sure if that’s the right grammatical term; I mean the opposite of 
‘subordinate clause’). He doesn’t say “If it rains I shan’t go”, but “It rains. I don’t 
 24 
go.” A good example of it is the introduction to the first movement, which sounds 
like so many scraps but is a connected whole. People generally, when they first 
hear Bruckner, and for a long time, can’t hear his music ‘connected’. In the same 
way that ending of the 3
rd
 movement is not abrupt, but of course it seems so, 
unless you can listen to his way of telling the story. (By the way, the 3
rd
 
movement does not lead into the 4
th
.)
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What Wittgenstein calls “Bruckner’s way of telling the story” pertains essentially to 
Bruckner’s typical approach to the large-scale tonal-narrative of his symphonies. As 
Wittgenstein suggests, this is intrinsically related to the problem of hearing Bruckner’s 
music as a “connected whole.” The first obstacle for anyone who tries to hear Bruckner’s 
music “connected” is its unprecedented monumentality. The sheer size of a Bruckner 
symphony is attained mainly through a slowing of usual musical processes. The ideal of 
the Classical sonata form—which underlies the symphonies of Haydn, Mozart and 
Beethoven, for example—was dynamism: the music evolved both tonally and motivically 
to create the effect of goal-orientated forward motion. This dynamism was created both 
by harmonic motion and logical motivic transformation. Yet, as seen clearly in the first 
movement of Bruckner’s third symphony, instead of the classicist’s brief contrasted 
themes, skillfully bridged by interludes, Bruckner upsets the sonata form by setting forth 
a number of independent theme-groups, each consisting of well-contrasted motivated 
portions, and allowing each motif its full elaboration and expanse of time. This results in 
huge stretches of thematic development, and expansive sections of static harmony.
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Bruckner’s unaccustomed juxtaposition of blocks of unlike musical material—his 
‘abruptness’, in Wittgenstein's words—is a related obstacle that renders his music 
“unconnected” for many listeners. The fragmented introduction of the first movement of 
the third symphony begins to make sense once we attain a clear grasp of the typically 
Brucknerian so-called “redemptive” narrative of the symphony, especially of the fact—
pointed out indirectly by Wittgenstein—that the first and the last movements must be 
regarded as logical sequels, indispensable and supplementary to each other (thus, indeed, 
as Wittgenstein said, the third movement does not lead into the fourth). The “redemption” 
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lies simply in the success in securing tonic closure. Bruckner’s imaginative unorthodoxy 
with regard to the key schemes of his sonata form and his formal strategic innovations 
enables him to postpone the definitive arrival on the tonic. Only in the coda, which 
remains outside the sonata space proper, can the triumphant tonic be reasserted and, in 
terms of the narrative, bring about redemption (hence the considerable importance of the 
coda in a Bruckner symphony). 
The upshot is this: acknowledging that Bruckner’s 'abruptness' is an essential part 
of his musical language, hearing his music as a 'connected whole' rests on an overview of 
the tonal-narrative of the work with its uncontested, inevitable directionality. Here we 
come to a profound difference between Bruckner and Mahler, and to the reason for 
Wittgenstein’s contention that “a symphony by Bruckner is infinitely closer to a 
symphony from the heroic period than is one by Mahler.” As noted before, for some 
aspects of Mahler’s music there are precedents in Bruckner; yet Mahler’s approach to 
large-scale form was completely and radically new. Whereas a Bruckner symphony still 
exemplifies a closed system of musical relationship, Mahler introduced an innovative 
conception of musical form as a developing succession of individual episodes, held 
together by a complex network of interchangeable tonal relationships and by an 
elaborately developed system of motivic correspondences. This more open conception of 
form enabled Mahler to incorporate materials whose extreme contrasts would destroy the 
internal consistency of a more traditional context.  
Georg Henrik von Wright recalled that Wittgenstein said that there was something 
initially incorrect in the architecture of Mahler’s music.65 Taken at face value—as when 
the term "architecture" is straightforwardly taken to denote large-scale form—
Wittgenstein’s observation may sound quite trite, and perhaps it is. Still, one is obliged to 
consider that the simile of “architecture” is not uncommon also in Wittgenstein’s 
Nachlass. In particular, he refers to the architecture of mathematical systems, making the 
general point that a mathematical proposition can carry any weight, and is of any use, 
only insofar as there exists also a practice; otherwise it is no more than “a free floating 
piece of mathematical scaffolding” (see MS 121, 41-42). From Wittgenstein’s point of 
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view, when compared to Bruckner’s “way of telling the story,” Mahler’s way consists in 
precisely such a flawed architecture: if Bruckner is said to have composed in “main 
clauses,” then Mahler must have been composing, oddly enough, only in “subordinate 
clauses.”66 Thus understood, Mahler’s musical gestures veer away from their vertical 
axis; they become a kind of musical Scheinarchitektur. 
Mahler’s way of altering the meaning of tonality itself by means of his 
compositional procedures yielded music that may be fairly regarded as constructed. One 
may recall, in this context, Mahler’s comment that to him writing a symphony means 
constructing a world with all the technical means at his disposal.
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 Such considerations 
illuminate Wittgenstein’s assertion that Mahler is most unbearable precisely when he 
writes something that appears to be a perfectly grammatical musical phrase, for it is 
precisely in Mahler’s deceptive simplicity—not in his embellished harmony—that the 
constructed nature of his music becomes painfully acute. To use Wittgenstein’s own 
words, when writing in simple harmonic progressions, Mahler only appears to bear 
witness to Beethoven’s or Bruckner’s ancestral mother; in reality, since its rules of 
grammar are radically altered, Mahler's music bespeaks different things, involving 
concepts that are different, and ultimately, if it is a work of art at all, “it is one of a totally 
different sort.” Thus Wittgenstein’s point in reproaching Mahler—“you merely heard this 
from the others, this does not (really) belong to you”—begets its real philosophical thrust 
in a way that underscores the striking depth of Wittgenstein’s ambivalence toward 
Mahler’s musical persona: these musical gestures are merely Scheinarchitektur, not 
genuine avowals of the life of mankind—for how could they be?—and in this sense they 
are not authentic (unecht).
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We may conclude that the crux of Wittgenstein’s hostility toward Mahler, of all 
other contemporary composers, was not atonality in itself, but rather the constructed 
nature of his musical language. As I suggested before, in a sense, atonality per se was 
simply uninteresting for Wittgenstein. It was not even a problem. The following diary 
entry from January 27, 1931 lends further support for these claims: 
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The music of past times always corresponds to certain maxims of the good and 
the right of that time. We recognize Keller’s principles in Brahms, etc, etc. Thus 
good music, which is being conceived today or has been conceived recently, that 
is to say modern, must seem absurd; for if it corresponds to any of the maxims 
pronounced today, then it must be rubbish. The following sentence is not easy to 
understand but this is how things are: today no one is clever enough to formulate 
what is right [das Rechte], and all formulations and maxims that are pronounced 
are nonsense [Unsinn]. The truth would sound quite paradoxical to everyone. And 
the composer who feels this within him must stand with this feeling in opposition 
to everything that is nowadays pronounced, and thus must seem by the present 
standards absurd, foolish. But not absurd in the attractive sense (for that is 
basically what the contemporary view corresponds to), but rather in the sense of 
saying nothing [nichtssagend]. Labor is an example of this, where he really 
created something important, as he did in some few pieces. (D, 38) 
Wittgenstein presents three categories of contemporary music here: the good, the bad, 
and the meaningless. At least two of them—the first and the third—are genuinely 
intriguing from a philosophical perspective. According to Wittgenstein, bad modern 
music is conceived in accordance with prevailing contemporary principles, which are 
equally ill conceived. Most probably, Wittgenstein refers here to the predominant maxim 
of progress for which he had the deepest mistrust, as I noted before. Such was indeed the 
case with the emancipators of the dissonance in the name of progress during the first two 
decades of the 20
th
 Century, and Wittgenstein clearly had no patience with their senseless 
musical gesticulation.
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 In his view, such music was plain rubbish. 
Josef Labor exemplifies the intriguing category of the meaninglessly absurd. As I 
mentioned above, Labor, a protégé of the Wittgenstein family, was perhaps the only 
contemporary composer who won kudos from Ludwig Wittgenstein.
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 It is reasonable to 
say that even the best of Labor’s music must have seemed absurd by the prevailing 
standard of progress. Indeed, against the background of the musical scene of Fin-de-
Siècle Vienna, Labor’s ultra-conservative, through-and-through tonal music gives the 
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impression of having been composed in a time warp. Some of Wittgenstein’s later 
remarks on Labor (dated approximately six months after the one just quoted above) 
corroborate this impression of inadequacy in Labor's music:  
Labor’s seriousness is a very late seriousness. (MS 110, 231 – CV, 10) 
Labor, when writing good music, is absolutely unromantic. This is a very 
remarkable and significant characteristic. (MS 111, 2 – CV, 13)71  
If we may recognize Keller’s poetry in Brahms’s themes, and if there is objective 
significance to the fact that these two men lived at the same time, as Wittgenstein 
suggested (cf. LC, 32), then, quite conversely, we may experience in Labor’s meaningless 
absurdity, in the fact that such music is seriously composed so very late, “a dissolution of 
the resemblances which unite [a culture’s] ways of life,” to use G. H. von Wright’s 
words.
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 In other words, Labor's music lends an experience of an aspect of decline.  
A further observation is in place here. It may seem as if Wittgenstein simply took 
sides in the great musical dispute that pervaded Fin-de-Siècle Vienna between Brahms’ 
supporters and Wagner’s enthusiasts. His clear rejection of progressive music seems to 
place him squarely among arch-conservatives such as composer Josef Labor and music 
critic Eduard Hanslick. Hanslick, like Labor, was closely associated with the 
Wittgenstein family; he was the most outspoken champion of Brahms’ music in Vienna 
and the fiercest critic of Wagnerian innovations. Yet, as one would expect, Wittgenstein’s 
position is ultimately much more complex and fine-shaded. His great admiration for 
Brahms’ genius notwithstanding, Wittgenstein was still highly critical of some aspects of 
his music. His various comparisons between Brahms and Bruckner, for example, in 
which he points out that Brahms’ music lacks orchestral color, suggest the convictions of 
a true Wagnerianer (see D, 44; 55-56). In fact, this kind of critique was fairly widespread 
among Brahms’ detractors at that time. Still, Wittgenstein’s most striking remark 
concerning Brahms was: “Music came to a full stop with Brahms; and even in Brahms I 
can begin to hear the sound of machinery.”73 Here, once again, Wittgenstein expresses a 
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familiar train of thought held by others, ultimately traceable back to Heinrich Schenker, 
who felt that the great tradition of Austro-German music had come to an end with 
Brahms.
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 My point is this: by conceiving Brahms’ music as a kind of zenith in the 
development of music, Wittgenstein sets the grounds for rejecting both the progressive 
approach and the conservative approach as viable options. Thus Wittgenstein’s position 
actually transcends the Brahms-Wagner controversy. Labor’s noble yet meaninglessly 
absurd rehash of classicism and Strauss’ base, contrapuntal tinkering with harmony are 
both symptomatic of cultural decline. 
This leaves us with the last alternative—good modern music—which, according 
to Wittgenstein, is actually no alternative at all. Incommensurability entailed by the 
concept of cultural decline renders the endeavor to create good modern music an absurd, 
albeit, according to Wittgenstein, an attractive absurd. One cannot, or at least one is not 
clever enough to formulate the right maxim or principle for our times—for what principle 
could be coherently pronounced amidst a dissolution of the resemblances which unite a 
culture’s ways of life?—so, ipso facto, one cannot conceive of music that would 
correspond to the unpronounced. Thus, the precious little that Wittgenstein has to say 
about the category of good modern music is that this very notion is paradoxical.  
Granting that contemporary music is a futile project tout court, what is left for a 
music of the future? Wittgenstein’s tentative answer betrays, once again, a deeply 
Spenglerian vein: 
I should not be surprised if the music of the future would be monophonic 
[einstimmig]. Or is this just because I cannot clearly imagine several voices? In 
any case, I cannot imagine that the old large forms (string quartet, symphony, 
oratorio, etc) could play any role at all. If something like this comes, it will have 
to be—I believe—simple, transparent. In a certain sense, naked. Or will this 
apply only to a certain race, only to one kind of music (?) (D, 31)
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For Spengler, the future is always transcendent to the current epoch—“only youth has a 
future, and is future”, he wrote76—and it is always marked by a return to the simplest, 
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most basic expression of life.
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 A passage that Wittgenstein wrote in September of 1931 
echoes Spengler’s cyclic conception of cultural rejuvenation: “The works of great 
masters are suns, which rise and set around us. The time will come for every great work 
that is now in the descendent to rise again” (MS 111, 194 – CV, 15). We may, then, 
understand Wittgenstein’s notion of the music of the future as the transcendent beginning 
of a new cultural epoch, hence the rejuvenation of music as a genuine avowal of the life 
of mankind. Thus Wittgenstein’s position regarding the music of the future is consistent 
with his rejection of the aforementioned three categories of contemporary music, which 
are all immanent in the declining present epoch. 
Wittgenstein envisions that a return to musical meaningfulness would take the 
form of monophonic music, or music in unison. Monophony, as distinguished from either 
polyphony or heterophony, simply means music for a single voice or part. Yet it is crucial 
to emphasize that the term monophony is not synonymous with an unaccompanied 
melody. A melody specifically exemplifies musical movement that is set within internal 
musical boundaries: we hear that it begins, that it ends, and that is moves from its 
beginning toward its end. It is a closed system, as Wittgenstein acknowledged (RPP I 
§647). In tonal music, this has largely, albeit not exclusively, to do with harmony. But a 
monophony can be melodious without having a melody. An obvious example of such 
unbounded musical movement is a plainchant, or Gregorian chant, which is also the 
standard reference for monophony. The context of the passage quoted above strongly 
suggests that such a pre-tonal monophony is precisely what Wittgenstein had in mind. 
First and foremost, Wittgenstein’s special interest in the problem of understanding 
Kirchtonarten (church modes or Gregorian modes) is evident in the Nachlass (see e.g. PR 
§124; RPP I §639; PI §535), and in fact, Wittgenstein’s first discussion of aspect 
perception in relation to music occurs in the Philosophical Remarks in reference to 
church modes.  
Furthermore, by referring to something like a pre-tonal monophony as the music 
of the future, Wittgenstein echoes a broad intellectual concern regarding the putative 
origins of music that became widespread in central Europe from the turn of the 20
th
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Century.
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 A brief historical excursion is required to substantiate this claim. 
Wittgenstein’s Vienna was the intellectual cradle for the newly founded discipline of 
Musikwissenschaft (musicology): in 1870 Eduard Hanslick was the first to be offered a 
professorial chair in musicology. In 1898, musicologist Guido Adler was offered a 
professorial chair in Vienna. In his inaugural speech at the University of Vienna, Adler 
defined for the first time the agenda for musicological research in the German speaking 
universities for the years to come, establishing an archeology with which to reconstruct 
music history from its very first beginnings.
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 The interest in the origins of music also 
flourished in England, already during the second half of the 19
th
 Century: both Charles 
Darwin and Herbert Spencer offered evolutionary theories of music. These theories were 
received with great interest in the continent, and in 1911 psychologist and comparative 
musicologist Carl Stumpf published his book on the origins of music,
80
 in which he 
criticized Darwin and Spencer for failing to account for the specific features of music.  
In the same year, Wittgenstein arrived in Cambridge and engaged intensely in 
problems pertaining to the psychology of music under the supervision of Charles S. 
Myers.
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 Stumpf’s work had a substantial presence in the milieu of the experimental 
psychologists in Cambridge: Myers himself used Stumpf’s technical notion of “fusion” 
(Tonverschmelzung), sometimes without explicit reference;
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 the work of his colleague, 
C. W. Valentine, is replete with references to Stumpf’s writings.83 In Cambridge, 
Wittgenstein was exposed to Myers’s own work on primitive music and the origins of 
music.
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 Myers clearly followed Stumpf in connecting the question concerning the 
origins of music with the question of how music evolved in the way it did. With these 
historical observations in place, a further important point is required to drive home my 
claim regarding Wittgenstein’s reference to pre-tonal monophony as the music of the 
future. As Alexander Rehding observes, the search for the origins of music in the early 
20
th
 Century was not merely of archeological interest; it became instrumental in defining 
the tradition of tonal music as the subject matter of a science of music, not coincidentally, 
at a time when this tradition was increasingly perceived to be under threat from 
contemporary composition.
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 Against this backdrop, I suggest that Wittgenstein’s 
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advocating of monophony as the music of the future can readily be seen as a certain 
condensed version of this broad concern. 
With this notion of pre-tonal monophony as the putative origin of music, we come 
full circle back to our use of language with its fine-shades of behavior and meaning. One 
must acknowledge the fact that plainchant means primarily a vocal setting of a text: in 
liturgy, word and music are indissolubly connected. Instead of a melody in the modern 
sense, we have a series of inflections from a reciting tone that corresponds to the actual 
verbalization or vocalization of the text. According to Jeremy Yudkin: 
The music [in plainchant] is composed to words, which form grammatical units of 
sense, and the music reflects this sense. This does not mean that the music is 
“emotive” in the modern usage of the term, nor does it mean that the music 
indulges in “word painting” as in the Renaissance and Baroque eras (although 
instances of both of these practices can be cited). It means rather that in the 
clearest possible way the music is tied to the structure of the text, illuminating 
and clarifying the grammatical sense.
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To a large extent, the establishing of the reciting tone, the inflections and their range are 
vocal gestures, which are used like punctuation signs in a sentence. Plainchant epitomizes 
the “significant irregularity” that Wittgenstein points out as the hallmark of “phenomena 
akin to language in music” (MS 121, 26 – CV, 34).87 The earliest chants must simply 
have been repetitions of a single pitch for every syllable of the text. Small inflections 
were added to mark the beginning of the whole reading and its end, the end of a sentence, 
or even a question form. Long segments were divided into smaller phrases by “musical 
commas”—endings that differ in pitch and formula from the ending of the whole 
sentence. Thus, a plainchant was originally an instrument of communication.
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Interestingly, a vivid impression of the sheer impact of the musical gestures of 
plainchant in relation to the spoken word at the very beginning of the Western musical 
tradition can be found in Saint Augustine’s Confessions, a text that Wittgenstein knew all 
too well. Augustine had a tremendous impact on the acceptance of music into the church 
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despite deep misgivings concerning the dangers in the musical obfuscation of language, 
which are given remarkable expression in book ix of the Confessions. However, he was 
able to conclude that the power of music to convey the truth of the sacred texts separated 
it from the mindless pleasures, and his embrace of musical practices in his own services 
at Hippo—introducing into his worship several Ambrosian hymns and the Milanese 
antiphonal manner of singing—proved crucial to the development of Christian liturgy. 
One would imagine that Wittgenstein, being so repulsed by the Post-Romantic excesses 
of his times, must have felt great sympathy for Augustine’s advocacy of the simplest 
musical expression. 
These considerations ultimately suggest that in Wittgenstein’s vision of the music 
of the future we find a harbinger of both his later vision of musical expression, and his 
later general emphasis on language in use.
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 The history of music palpably teaches us that 
in plainchant we find the happiest marriage of music and spoken language. When 
Wittgenstein writes about the strongly musical element in verbal language, he speaks of 
“a sigh, the intonation of voice in a question, in announcement, in longing; all the 
innumerable gestures made with the voice” (Z §161). It is in this flux of finely shaded 
intonation, Wittgenstein tells us, that we experience the meaning of words and make 
aesthetic judgments about them (cf. LC, 4). The music of the future is destined to be 
transparent precisely in the sense that sadness is transparent in a face; ideally, it is 
destined to be a physiognomy. Indeed such conception of “intransitive transparency” 
makes Wittgenstein’s alternative metaphor, that of “nakedness,” more apt. 
 
 
Music for the Meaning-Blind 
The history of 20
th
 Century music shows that it was Schoenberg, perhaps more decisively 
than any other composer of his time, who set sail toward a sonic landscape that became, 
at least for a while, the unmistakable music of the future. In the aftermath of the Second 
World War, Schoenberg’s notion of the 12-tone system, rigorously emulated and applied 
by Schoenberg’s most devoted disciple, Anton Webern, served as a catalyst for the young 
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post-war generation of composers on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean for breaking 
completely with common compositional practice. This "music of the future" even has a 
name: total (or integral) serialism. The name refers to the fundamental conception behind 
this music, which was a consistent treatment of all musical elements—pitch, rhythm, 
dynamics, texture, and ultimately, form itself—according to strictly serial procedures, 
resulting in a complete departure from previous musical assumptions and traditional 
musical gestures. Consistent application of this idea brought about also—in what I am 
tempted to dub as an act of oedipal instinct—the ultimate abrogation of the 
Schoenbergian principle of the 12-tone row, which was ironically conceived as a relic of 
the “Old World” by prominent avant-garde composers of the second half of the 20th 
Century, such as Pierre Boulez, Karlheinz Stockhausen and John Cage.  
 Our discussion has so far suggested that given the Spenglerian cum Schenkerian 
forces found at play in the background of Wittgenstein’s attitude toward contemporary 
music, we may expect nothing short of an insurmountable chasm between Wittgenstein 
the cultural pessimist, who admitted that he belongs together with Spengler “to the same 
group that is characteristic of these Times” (D, 28), and Schoenberg, the quintessential 
modernist, who avowed that he might be regarded conservative insofar as he conserves 
progress.
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 The precise nature of this chasm and its philosophical depth will now have to 
be made clear. Thus, the question before us is straightforward: how far removed is 
Schoenberg’s 12-tone music from Wittgenstein’s vision of the music of the future? To 
approach this question, a still closer look at the genesis of Schoenberg’s conception of the 
12-tone system is required.  
It is crucial to realize that the origins of atonality in Schoenberg’s music are 
already deeply seated in his theoretical approach to tonal music. As Ethan Haimo points 
out, this can be seen in a variety of ways in Schoenberg’s Harmonielehre (1911): he 
treats harmonic progression as not defining or establishing the tonic as the referential 
sonority; in his view, the diatonic collection does not define a key; and his explanations 
of chord formation blur the distinction between dissonance and consonance.
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 Tonality 
for Schoenberg was ultimately something of a contingency, causally explainable and 
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susceptible to progress. Of course, such a conception of tonality betrays the concerns of a 
progressive composer, rather than those of a theorist speaking apparently of an aspect of 
the past. As Leon Botstein observes, this theoretical stance was at the heart of 
Schoenberg’s confrontation with Heinrich Schenker: 
The crucial point of comparison between Schenker and the young Schoenberg 
was their shared conviction that music, although independent of words, operated 
by laws that were analogous to those of linguistic grammar… The divergence 
between the two men rested on their assumptions about the possible future range 
of evolution for musical grammar, and not on the principle that music required the 
use of formal structures adequate to its autonomous character. For Schoenberg, 
musical grammar had both a teleology and an evolutionary history. For Schenker 
its nature was fixed.
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The quarrel between the two men extended far beyond technical matters. At stake were 
diametrically opposed views of the musical mind, and ultimately, I suggest, diametrically 
opposed attitudes toward language.  
Consider, for instance, their dispute over the issue of non-chordal notes.
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Traditionally conceived, non-chordal notes—passing notes, suspensions, auxiliary notes 
etc.—differ from chordal dissonances in that their resolution does not involve a change of 
harmony. A non-chordal dissonance is therefore incidental, for it does not impinge on the 
harmonic progression; it yields a momentary sonorous effect without harmonic 
consequence. As Carl Dahlhaus pointed out, both Schenker and Schoenberg rejected this 
traditional view, but for opposite reasons: while Schoenberg thought that the notion of an 
incidental dissonance is a misnomer, Schenker denied that a dissonance might be in any 
sense essential to the harmony. Schenker’s position can readily be understood in the light 
of the précis of his theory, which I provided in the second section of the present essay 
("Aspects of Decline"). If hearing music is to be understood as an "exfoliation" of a 
fundamental harmonic structure, then passing notes are the layers, so to speak, cast off in 
the process.
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 Hearing music amounts to hearing through the non-chordal notes that 
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inhabit the various articulated musical layers (foreground, middleground or background), 
even those yielding the sonically harshest vertical combinations. In Schenker’s words: “It 
is as if a vacuum existed between the dissonant passing note and the stationary cantus 
firmus note.”95 That is, the mere sonorous effect of the dissonance, its mere acoustics, has 
no musical meaning. 
By contrast, Schoenberg’s approach manifests a remarkable obsession with the 
“logic” of the musical surface. He dogmatically maintains that no musical occurrence can 
be without significance for the context of the harmonic progression, even those fleeing 
moments that are virtually imperceptible. Thus, any dissonant harmony resulting from a 
passing note is actually a chord and should be rendered vertically and independently as an 
essential phenomenon, to wit, as an emancipated dissonance. Simply put, according to 
Schoenberg, there is actually no such thing as a non-chordal note. Yet while the harmonic 
plausibility of the emancipated dissonance was something of an established fact for 
Schoenberg, it eventually led him to a painstaking—at times, arguably unsuccessful—
pursuit of a justification of the harmonic function of the emancipated dissonance, and 
indeed, as I said before, to an obsession with what we could aptly call the “surface 
grammar” of music.96  
A further consideration of Schoenberg's attitude toward language—crucial for our 
discussion—brings us back to Karl Kraus, closing, in effect, a line of reasoning which I 
began by entertaining the alleged "Kraus Connection" between Wittgenstein and 
Schoenberg in the first section of the present essay ("Leads and Impasses"). It is evident 
that, on his part, Schoenberg misinterpreted the true nature of Kraus’ thinking about 
language. In 1911, the same year he published his Harmonielehre, Schoenberg wrote: 
One may let oneself be carried by language, but it carries only the man who 
would be capable, if it did not exist, of inventing it himself. ‘Language, mother of 
the idea,’ says Karl Kraus—as wrongly as if he had said the hen is there before 
the eggs. And as rightly. For that is how it is in the real work of art: everything 
gives the impression of having come first, because everything was born at the 
same moment. Feeling is already form, the idea is already the word.
97
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From Karl Kraus’ perspective, there is something misleading already in binding literature 
and music together as Schoenberg does. According to Kraus, there is an important 
difference between verbal art and the other arts: 
Why do people treat literature so insolently? Because they know the language. 
They would take the same liberties with the other arts if singing to one another, 
smearing one another with paint, or throwing plaster at one another were means of 
communication. The unfortunate thing is that verbal art works with a material that 
the rabble handles every day. That is why literature is beyond help.
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Yet the point is that music is not beyond help in this sense. We can see that Schoenberg 
gave Kraus’ acerbic dictum, “language is the mother of thought [Gedanke]”, a Romantic 
reading as a license (for the genius artist) to meddle with language if language proves to 
be inert. This is a blatant misreading of Kraus insofar as it ultimately renders the actual 
means of expression subservient to the notion of an idea or a thought.
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 This is a crucial 
observation for our present concerns: Schoenberg’s understanding of music as language 
precisely in this sense, in addition to his conviction that tonality has exhausted its natural 
resources, set the course, already in his middle period, toward the ultimate application of 
this misunderstanding of Kraus—the 12-tone system. 
As I noted before, by 1923 Schoenberg felt that he had exhausted the so-called 
“free atonal” style with its expressionist pretense. He then mobilized his forces to regain 
control over his own composition processes. Reflecting on his motivation to construct his 
12-tone system, Schoenberg wrote: 
[t]he desire for a conscious control over the new means and forms will arise in 
any artist’s mind; and he will wish to know consciously the laws and rules which 
govern the forms which he has conceived ‘as in a dream’. Strongly convincing as 
this dream may have been, the conviction that these new sounds obey the laws of 
nature and of our manner of thinking—the conviction that order, logic, 
comprehensibility and form cannot be present without obedience to such laws—
forces the composer along the road of exploration. He must find, if not laws or 
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rules, at least ways to justify the dissonant character of these harmonies and their 
successions.
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Schoenberg’s obsession with “logic” took the form of a relentless quest—both in his 
theoretical thinking and in his compositional practice—for musical coherence; coherence 
that was lost when tonality was dissolved. “In music,” he wrote, “there is no form without 
logic, there is no logic without unity.”101 Schoenberg used the term “coherence” to 
designate relationships that justify connections or meaningful interactions between the 
components of a sonic object. His attempt to emulate language is most explicit in his 
focus on finding and devising “musical connectives,” akin to connectives in logic, that, so 
he believed, regulate the element of fluency in music and clarify the logic of its formal 
progression. He maintained that musical material should be both coherent and varied: 
“The preservation of features constantly secures logic, and upon the presence or absence 
of these connectives is based the greater or lesser degree of fluency.”102  
Now Schoenberg’s 12-tone method was designed expressly to provide both 
coherence and variation in the musical material. At the heart of the system there is the 12-
tone row, which is an “abstract” structure, a set of potential relationships without any 
motivic content that is “logically prior” to the actual composition. The row is embodied 
in the actual musical details of a given composition: it determines the succession of 
pitches used in a piece, although it does not determine their registers or their durations, 
nor prescribe the textural layout of the music or its form. Schoenberg conceived the 12-
tone row as a pre-compositional fund for motivic possibilities, whereupon springs its 
sense of musical omnipresence. Thus according to Schoenberg: 
The weightiest assumption behind twelve-tone composition is this thesis: 
Whatever sounds together (harmonies, chords, the result of part-writing) plays its 
part in the expression and in presentation of the musical idea in just the same way 
as does all that sounds successively (motive, shape, phrase, sentence, melody, 
etc.) and it is equally subject to the law of comprehensibility.
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In Schoenberg’s philosophy of composition, the notion of coherence is 
complemented by the notion of comprehensibility. “Composition with twelve tones has 
no other aim than comprehensibility,”104 declared Schoenberg. Comprehensibility in 
general refers to conditions that allow the listener to grasp something as a whole, to bind 
impressions together into a form. As Carl Dahlhaus pointed out, the notion of 
comprehensibility, as Schoenberg uses it, is ambiguous: it refers to the emancipated 
dissonance per se, and at the same time it implies that the dissonance has a real function 
in the harmonic context.
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 Either way, according to Schoenberg's somewhat circular 
formulation, a musical content is comprehensible when it is surveyable and suitably 
articulated; that is, when its components share such coherence among one another and 
with the whole, as would in general be required for comprehensibility. In other words, 
coherence is a necessary condition for comprehensibility, which in turn ultimately 
amounts to the listener’s ability to analyze quickly, to determine components and their 
coherence. 
The contrived nature of 12-tone composition, in contradistinction to tonal 
composition, gives this notion of comprehensibility primary importance. In his third 
Gedanke manuscript (1925), Schoenberg points out that while compositions executed 
tonally proceed so as to bring every occurring tone into a direct or indirect relationship to 
the tonic, 12-tone composition presupposes knowledge of these relationships and does 
not render them as a problem still to be worked out. In this sense, 12-tone composition 
works with whole “complexes” akin to “a language that works with comprehensive 
concepts [umfassenden Begriffen], whose scope and meaning as generally known are 
presupposed.”106 Comprehensibility pertains to our ability to grasp and retain such fixed 
“concept-complexes”, and to follow their implications and consequences. 
Let us return now to our primary question: how far removed is Schoenberg’s 12-
tone music from Wittgenstein’s vision of the music of the future? In a sense, by 1923 
Schoenberg appeared to be heading back to a conservatively systematized conception of 
music. Yet, while his dodecaphonic works are thought out and worked out musically, 
they draw their motivic material from a contrived source: the 12-tone row.
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 Schoenberg 
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was painfully aware that there was no escape from total chromaticism; for him, the genie 
of dissonance, once emancipated, could never be returned to the bottle again. Schoenberg 
argued that the 12-tone system is a necessary step in the evolution of Western music, and 
he designed it for the sole purpose of replacing the structural differentiations formerly 
furnished by tonality. Thus Schoenberg’s late period music actually exemplifies a 
phantom U-turn to the old Western tradition of composing, a deliberate, conscious leap 
beyond what had been regarded as the “natural fountain” of musical language; yet one 
that Schoenberg firmly believed would “insure the supremacy of German music for the 
next hundred years.”  
Not surprisingly, Schoenberg’s hubris drew a vehement response from Heinrich 
Schenker: 
The great proof against Schoenberg is the people; they have never gone along 
with him and never will. There are not two summits in an art. Schoenberg has 
already experienced the one, a second, like the one now being cultivated, cannot 
blossom. Schoenberg produces a homunculus in music; it is a machine. Machines 
are supposed to be substitute for human strength, a surrogate. Now there are of 
course surrogates, such as the one for traveling, the automobile, but never can 
there be a surrogate for the soul. Such a complicated operation is not intelligible 
for it. … The product of Schoenberg’s machine shall not be used.108 
Schenker’s riposte remarkably encapsulates the main themes that comprise what I 
maintain would be an adequate Wittgensteinian response to Schoenberg’s dodecaphonic 
music: a sense of transgression, of soullessness and of contrivance. I have already 
discussed the first theme in detail. Schoenberg’s 12-tone system is undoubtedly a fully-
fledged instance of a systematic deviation from the rules of harmony. Furthermore, as 
pointed out before, the system was conceived not only to dislodge tonality, but also to 
downright take over its status as grammar. Schenker contended that “the great proof 
against Schoenberg is the people.” Yet a much deeper insight is gained along 
Wittgensteinian lines: there is simply no reason for the rules of 12-tone composition to be 
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what they are, given the kind of beings we are, the purposes we have, our shared 
discriminatory capacities, and certain general features of the world we inhabit. The kind 
of musical distinctions called for by dodecaphonic composition—for instance, identifying 
a certain passage as based on a certain transposition of the inverted retrograde form of the 
original 12-tone row used in the given piece—are not just very difficult to make; they are 
simply not important in our lives, certainly not in the sense that questions and answers, 
introductions and conclusions are.  
There is no wonder, then, that the rules of 12-tone composition aim at nothing 
other than creating the conditions of comprehensibility. Schoenberg’s striving for 
comprehensibility inevitably recalls Karl Kraus’ repartee: “The most incomprehensible 
talk comes from people who have no other use for language than to make themselves 
understood.”109 A comparison between Schoenberg’s standard of comprehensibility and 
Wittgenstein’s standard of transparency or “nakedness” points at their crucial difference. 
According to Wittgenstein, a musical gesture is not transparent by virtue of the correct 
applications of “rules of transparency”; rather, its transparency resides precisely in their 
absence, indeed in the vacuity of the very notion of such rules. Transparency in this sense 
is not an epistemic notion. A musical gesture is transparent because it is already given to 
us with a familiar physiognomy, already vertically related to our world of thoughts and 
feelings, whereupon there is no sense in which we can say that it needs to be made 
comprehensible.  
Soullessness and contrivance go hand in hand. Schenker’s allegation that 
Schoenberg’s music toils at becoming a surrogate for the soul is quite remarkable. For 
Wittgenstein, nothing that is premised upon exactitude, calculation and mechanism can 
said to be soulful, since our recognition and description of soulful expression, musical or 
otherwise, is informed with, and constituted by evidential uncertainty, or “imponderable 
evidence.” The imponderability of this kind of evidence is significantly reflected in the 
way we attempt to communicate our Menschenkenntnis and in the measure of the success 
of our justifications. Here the contrast between transparency and comprehensibility 
comes to a head. As we have seen, Schoenberg’s view of music as language is rooted in 
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what he perceived as a Krausian license to invent auxiliary means of expression in order 
to solve a particular problem—to wit, to regain control over unruly atonality.  
The 12-tone system is an extraordinary attempt to derive, through a series of 
manipulations, a wealth of material, complex and varied, from an initial pitch collection 
that, in itself, is pre-compositional, hence musically inert and barren. In a banal sense, the 
fundamental elements of tonal composition—for instance, the particular pitch collection 
that we call the diatonic scale—are also “logically prior” to the composition. A tune like 
“Twinkle, twinkle, little star” has the particular effects of movement, rest and closure that 
it has because we hear the first and the last tones of the diatonic scale as the “same tone,” 
and because we hear a certain hierarchic relationship obtaining between the other tones in 
the scale. In Wittgenstein’s view, this phenomenology is embedded in, and makes any 
sense solely in terms of praxis (ultimately, our ways of life). Yet the point is that in 
Schoenberg’s 12-tone system, “pre-compositional” means primarily “a-gestural”; and the 
latter notion, if it means anything at all, denotes something lifeless, soulless (cf. PI 
§§284-285). It is in this sense that the 12-tone row in itself is musically inert and 
barren;
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 hence at least some musical gestures found in 12-tone music are contrived by 
means of deliberate, rule-governed manipulation of this sort of pre-compositional 
material.
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 The result, to use Schoenberg’s own telling analogy, is to be likened to a 
language comprised of concept-complexes whose meaning is semantically rigid like 
labels or name tags.
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Schoenberg was painfully aware of the constructed nature of his music, and he 
tried to counterbalance this impression by appealing to a view of (real) art as an organic 
whole: 
The inspiration, the vision, the whole, breaks down during its representation into 
details whose constructed realization reunites them into the whole. But this other 
constructed music which I have mentioned, and of which I have already seen 
examples, is different. It does not set out from the vision of a whole but builds 
upwards from below according to a preconceived plan or scheme but without a 
truly visualized idea of the whole, and it works up the basic material anxiously 
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and without freedom. So whereas I proceed from a vision, working out the details 
and fitting them out for the purpose they will have to fulfill—and these details do 
not exist without that purpose—truly ‘constructed’ music works material up into a 
systematically arrived-at, synthetically presented whole, which did not previously 
exist. In the former case it was the details that did not exist before; but in the 
latter, the whole.
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There is an obvious premonition in Schoenberg’s characterization of the “other 
constructed music”, of the kind of music making that was to take center stage in Europe 
under the banner of “total serialism” around the time of this death in 1951. Yet 
Schoenberg’s attempt to rebut the charges concerning the constructed nature of his own 
music on grounds of the primacy of the musical idea over the construction of means for 
its expression betrays, once again, his misreading of Karl Kraus. Thus his defense 
remains ineffective from a Wittgensteinian point of view; for what is infuriating from the 
Wittgensteinian perspective is not so much the alleged genesis of this kind of 
compositional practice, as its pretense to inherit music. We can learn this by analogy 
from Wittgenstein’s famous remark on Esperanto: 
The feeling of disgust we get if we utter an invented word with invented 
derivative syllables. The word is cold, lacking in associations, and yet it plays at 
being ‘language’. A system of purely written signs would not disgust us so much. 
(MS 132, 69 – CV, 52)114 
The striking analogy between Lazar Ludwik Zamenhof’s vision of an international 
auxiliary language and Schoenberg’s vision of the music of the future has not evaded 
scholarship.
115
 Both projects arose as an attempt to solve a particular problem by rational 
means, laying down publicly defined rules for generating diversified means for 
expressing ideas. Both projects set themselves to overcome an initial alienation by 
communities steeped in tradition and well versed in the old ways of expressing ideas, and 
ultimately both met a similar fate: to be embraced only by a small, albeit passionate elite. 
Still, the most striking characteristic that Esperanto and dodecaphonic music share is the 
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decisive shunning of all local or contingent effects of interaction among the elements that 
comprise an utterance. As we have seen, in the case of 12-tone music, this took the form 
of a complete and irrevocable exorcising of the effects of tonality. In the case of 
Esperanto, this took the form of construing a vocabulary and a syntax that are 
exemplarily regular, efficient, consistent and accessible (to Europeans, at least).  
As J. C. Nyíri observed, Wittgenstein’s nausea had to do not so much with 
contrivance as with use.
116
 What seemed to him despicable about Esperanto was the fact 
that this is an invented language—learnable by memorizing an economical vocabulary 
and a few syntactic rules—that one might want to use poetically. Rudolf Carnap, a 
passionate champion of language planning in general and of Esperanto in particular, 
recounts Wittgenstein’s vehemently negative response when he learned of Carnap’s 
interest in the problem of an international language like Esperanto. “A language which 
had not ‘grown organically,’” wrote Carnap, “seemed to him not only useless but 
despicable.”117 It is significant to note in this context that Carnap was particularly 
enthusiastic about the poetic promise that Esperanto held.
118
 Carnap recalls a 
performance of Goethe’s Iphigenie in Esperanto translation as one of the high points of 
an international Esperanto conference, which he attended. “It was a stirring and uplifting 
experience for me,” he wrote, “to hear this drama, inspired by the ideal of one humanity, 
expressed in the new medium which made it possible for thousands of spectators from 
many countries to understand it, and to become united in spirit.”119 
It was this vain attempt—vain for its artificiality—at a "vertical leap" from the 
language game of information to the language game of expression that infuriated 
Wittgenstein (cf. RPP I §170; §888). In the case of our language—a language that had 
"grown organically"—such a "vertical leap" to an (intransitively) expressive use of words 
is actually quite mundane, and significantly so. In fact, this is precisely Wittgenstein's 
point in suggesting that "understanding a sentence is much more akin to understanding a 
theme in music than one may think" (PI §527ff.). We may experience the meaning of 
words as irreplaceable, the thought in the sentence as "something that is expressed only 
by these words in these positions" (PI §531). Not only poetic language, but all language 
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may be "musical" or "soulful" in this sense. Still, the seemingly unruly distinctions we 
make in experiencing the meaning of words, and the various ways in which we justify 
these distinctions are vertically complex in the sense exemplified by musical gesture (cf. 
PI §533; LC 40). Inability to make such distinctions or to understand these kinds of 
justification is the mark of what Wittgenstein calls "meaning-blindness" (PI II 175-6, 
210; RPP I §§189, 202-6, 243-50, 342-4). The meaning-blind are locked out of that 
familiar physiognomy, which makes language something that we understand, not as a 
sign for something else, not transitively, but rather intransitively, like music, as “an 
avowal of the life of mankind”. They are not attuned with the rest of us, not mutually 
voiced with respect to our fine-shaded use of language and behavior. For them, 
something has meaning only as part of an agreed symbolism used to convey information 
by depicting particular states of affairs. Such inability marks a total failure to become 
acculturated. 
Thus, by conceiving language as music, Wittgenstein makes a fundamental point: 
words and phrases in language strike us as meaningful quite independently of their ability 
to convey information, and this feat, marking the success of acculturation, ultimately 
presupposes the entire range of our language games. We can invent a language, says 
Wittgenstein, in which “a b c d e” means “The weather is fine,” and we could certainly 
use such an invented symbolism to communicate information about the weather. Yet the 
difference between such an invented language and natural, “organically grown” language 
is this: 
[i]n the one I can’t move. It is as if one of my joints were in splints, and I were not 
yet familiar with the possible movements, so that I as it were keep on bumping 
into things. (RPP II §259; Z §6) 
A natural language is fine-shaded, containing a myriad of possibilities that open up with 
each nuance of tone, each hint of a smile, and with all those “innumerable transitions 
which I can make and the other [who is not a native speaker of the language] can’t” (RPP 
I §1078). According to Wittgenstein, this is how understanding a sentence is comparable 
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with understanding a piece of music. By contrast, an invented language is rigid, 
spasmodic, cold and lacking in associations. Its vocabulary is “a-gestural” in the sense 
that we have “no objection to replacing one word with another arbitrary one of our own 
invention” (PI §530). Thus, an invented language is “soulless”: all that we have are signs 
that are translatable into action by means of rules. For Wittgenstein, such a language 
“does not get far as an impression, like that of a picture; nor are stories written in this 
language” (Z §145). 
The analogy between Esperanto and Schoenberg’s 12-tone system yields a 
conclusive answer to the question how far removed Schoenberg’s post-1923 music is 
from Wittgenstein’s vision of the music of the future. From Wittgenstein's perspective, 
Schoenberg’s 12-tone music would be music for the meaning-blind, modeled on a 
conception of language as an artificial edifice, whose conditions of meaningfulness 
primarily consist in deriving a wealth of forms from musically barren sonic material by 
means of rules of coherence and comprehensibility; a kind of music, whose very essence 
shuns the familiar expanse of our Menschenkenntnis, where tonal music roams (cf. CV 8-
9). An actual performance of such music for the meaning-blind, enfolded by the gestural 
bravado of classically trained musicians, would be as despicable from Wittgenstein’s 
point of view as a theatrical performance of Goethe’s sublime poetry in Esperanto—it 
would be akin to an acquaintance with a surrogate for the soul. 
 
 
Conclusion 
I began my essay with Stanley Cavell's suggestion that Schoenberg's idea of the 12-tone 
row is a serviceable image of Wittgenstein's idea of grammar. The terrain is now 
carefully charted, and Cavell's direction appears unwarranted. We have seen that the only 
possible way to yoke Wittgenstein and Schoenberg (albeit indirectly) is through the 
respective impact of Karl Kraus's vision of language on both men. Yet this connection 
proved to be antithetical: Wittgenstein got Kraus's idea that "language is the mother of 
thought" exactly right, whereas Schoenberg got it exactly wrong. For Wittgenstein, 
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thought presents itself only in our use of language, and understanding music is an avowal 
of the human life that shows itself in the grammar of our language. Music may be said to 
be transparent by letting itself be understood in this sense. Thus barren and inert, there is 
nothing in Schoenberg's row, the pre-compositional repository of musical thoughts, and 
in our presumed ability to comprehend these thoughts, that could compare to the power 
of grammar—as Cavell so aptly put it—to reveal pervasive yet unforeseen conditions of 
our existence. Wittgenstein's aversion toward modern music was shown to be rooted in 
his penetrating philosophical insight into musical meaning, not easily dismissible as a 
mere manifestation of a conservative musical taste. 
A final passage from Karl Kraus would be appropriate for an epilogue to our 
discussion of these two incompatible visions of the music of the future: 
My pointer turns backwards; for me, what has been is never complete, and I stand 
otherwise in time. In whatever future I roam, and whatever I take hold of, it 
always turns into the past.
120
 
In their mature work, both Wittgenstein and Schoenberg heralded a return to language, 
yet in different senses. Wittgenstein sought after transparency, Schoenberg after 
comprehensibility; for the one the very idea of a surrogate for the soul was an 
abomination, for the other—a fountain of youth. And so they roamed in different 
futures.
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